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Abstract 
Most agrarian scholars argue that long historic processes of colonialism, capitalist development and im-
plementation of neo-liberal structural policies in Sub-Saharan Africa have resulted in deagrarianisation 
and its sub-genre of depeasantisation particularly in South Africa. I argue that this long historic process 
epitomised, in some cases, by abandonment of cropping fields and deactivation of agriculture was uneven 
between and within communities across South Africa. Glossing over the geographic and socially differenti-
ated outcomes has partly led to the general characterisation of rural communities as relic agrarian popula-
tions that need to be modernised through a new wave of large-scale land based investments. To substanti-
ate, I use the case study of Xolobeni, which is situated on the Wild Coast, in the Eastern Cape Province. The 
Xolobeni community is engaged in a struggle against the South African government and the Transworld 
Energy and Minerals Resources (TEM) from Australia, which wants to invest in titanium mining in the area 
since 2001. Following a series of struggles, in 2018 the North Gauteng High Court ruled that the communi-
ty has a right to say no to a development project, in line with the international principle of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC). In addition to this legal right, I posit that the community actively used land for 
multiple livelihoods including gardening, livestock and crop production as well as marine resource harvest-
ing for both consumption and for sale in contrast to the deactivation thesis. Given local processes of social 
differentiation, the benefits differed to a degree across a continuum of subsistence-oriented households, 
market-oriented households, wage and sale reliant households and wage reliant households. However, in 
all cases land-based livelihoods were essential in enabling households to create a higher standard of living. 
Consequently, the community preferred ecotourism and an agrarian model of development that would pre-
serve their livelihoods, conserve ecological natural resources and reduce rural poverty as well as contribute 
to wider national economic development.
Introduction
I argue that the long historic process of deagrarianisation epitomised by the deactivation of agriculture and 
land-based livelihoods was uneven between and within communities across South Africa. Failure to dif-
ferentiate can result in the blanket application of rural development policies that consider all communities 
as relic agrarian populations especially in the context of a new global rush for land in Africa. I use the case 
of the Xolobeni community, which is situated on the Wild Coast, in the Eastern Cape Province to substan-
tiate my argument. The community is against mining investments from Transworld Energy and Minerals 
Resources (TEM) owned by Minerals Resource Commodities (MRC) from Australia. MRC wants to acquire 
a mining licence for a 22km strip of coastline, two kilometres wide, from the Eastern Cape covering 2 867 
hectares (Koen 2016). The Broad-based Economic Empowerment (BEE) partner is called the Xolobeni Em-
powerment Company. The area contains about ‘139 million tonnes of titanium-bearing minerals, including 
ilmenite, zircon, leucoxene and rutile, mainly used in pigment manufacture’ (Ledwaba 2019:1). The invest-
ment is for US $200 million and can possibly create up to 300 permanent jobs (Koen 2016). Following a 
series of struggles, the North Gauteng High Court, in 2018, eventually ruled that the community has a right 
to say no to the project in line with the international principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). 
To the South African government the ruling is retrogressive because it will strangle mining investments 
and efforts to develop the poor communal areas. However, evidence from this study demonstrates alterna-
tive development in the form of activated agricultural fields, grazing lands, marine resources and harvests 
from natural resources among other wider livelihoods benefits, which outweigh the benefits from mining 
when combined with eco-tourism. 
This argument is based on a survey of 80 Amadiba community homesteads conducted by the Institute for 
Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) and the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) researchers, in partner-
ship with the Amadiba Crisis Committee and local residents. Data was collected in the wards of Xolobeni 
(n=23), Mdatya (n=20), Mtentu (n=19), and Sigidi (n=18). Researchers collected data on crop production, 
livestock production, ocean harvesting, natural resources, consumption patterns and asset investments. 
This quantitative data was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Researchers also 
held open-ended discussions with the residents of Xolobeni to find out their preferred models of devel-
opment. In addition to field data, meeting reports of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Amadiba 
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Crisis Committee, companies and communities, as well as government laws and policy documents helped to 
shed light on legal contestations, nature of livelihoods and preferred development models. Company, com-
munity and court reports at times offered distinctively different views, but a careful reading of all revealed 
many closer accounts of developments on the ground, and of the political rhetoric that surrounded them. 
Media articles were also of use. From such a mix of research methods, the study was able to capture the local 
dynamics and weave them into a story presented in five interrelated parts in this paper.
The first part to follow applies a class analytic approach to critique the deagrarianisation and deactivation 
theses and highlight the importance of geographic and social differentiation in analysing communities and 
processes of agrarian change. The second section revisits the court victory by the Xolobeni community and 
cautions against the dangers of a finagled consultation process dominated by powerful local elites and men. 
The third section provides the empirics that shows the evidence of cropping, livestock production, marine 
resource harvesting, water collection and multiple livelihoods benefits from the natural resources. The ar-
gument is that the envisaged mining will destroy the rich land-based livelihoods as happened elsewhere in 
South Africa. This then leads to a class analysis in the fourth section that reveals four social groups within 
Xolobeni. These are subsistence-oriented households, market-oriented households, wage and sale reliant 
households and wage reliant households. This class analytic approach then informs broad policy proposi-
tions in the final section. The next section situates the study within global debates.
A class analytic approach
Most agrarian scholars argue that the long historic processes of colonialism, capitalist development and 
implementation of neo-liberal structural policies have resulted in deagrarianisation and depeasantisation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The term deagrarianisation refers to ‘the long-term process of occupational adjust-
ment, income-earning reorientation, social identification and spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from 
strictly agricultural-based modes of livelihood’ Bryceson (2004:618). Bryceson (1996; 2004) argues that the 
specific form of deagrarianisation prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa is best characterised as depeasantisation, 
referring to the shrinkage in numbers of small-scale community-based family farmers, their loss of eco-
nomic capacity and social coherence. However, the extrication of agrarian-based peasant livelihoods has not 
happened on a uniform scale across and within Sub-Saharan Africa. There is significant variation between 
and within communities. Smallholder agricultural production still form the nucleus of livelihoods in some 
countries and communities. For example, Zimbabwe witnessed a dramatic land reform programme that 
redistributed land to more than 150 000 smallholder producers with significant tobacco outputs (Scoones 
et al 2010). Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia rely on smallholder food production to feed their populations 
(Chirwa and Dorward 2013, Joala et al 2016, Zamchiya 2018). 
Nevertheless, in South Africa, the more dominant longitudinal studies have empirically demonstrated a 
reduction in the area of cultivated fields and abandonment of cropping fields even in areas of high rainfall 
(see Hajdu 2006, de la Hey and Beinart 2017, Mfono 2007, Ntsebeza 1995, Shackleton et al 2019). Eastern 
Cape Province where Xolobeni is located is the most affected in terms of the decline. According to de la Hey 
and Beinart (2017: 768) the decline is largely caused by the inability of homestead heads to mobilise family 
labour or pay for labour. Shackelton et al (2019:693) attribute the trend to the economic context, insuffi-
cient agricultural inputs, lack of government support and policy constraints, socio-cultural change, and en-
vironmental issues. This has led to the argument that agricultural development is no longer central to rural 
livelihoods (Ntsebeza 1995). Consequently, Beinart and Delius (2018:1) see radical land reform as ‘a weapon 
for mass destruction’ because they simply do not see the evidence of smallholder productivity. They argued 
that, ‘the current levels of production and impediments to expansion suggests that the idea of transferring 
large amounts of new land to smallholders is more likely to do economic harm than alleviate poverty.’ 
Whilst the studies about the decline of agriculture have rich archival, aerial and photographic evidence, 
they tend to look at smallholder farmers as a homogenous group. The problem is in the way they charac-
terise and generalise reality in a linear trajectory. Yet even in the same community, one social group can be 
expanding production whilst another is deactivating with even potential to reactivate in future. As Mtero 
(2012) has argued, communities are not fixed in concrete positions. Abandoning crop fields cannot be a 
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culture, a mind-set that is pervasive, affecting all sectors of social groups. Hence, a class analytic approach 
can be of use here. Its value is in demonstrating that there is variation in field cultivation across the coun-
try, within the country and even within the same community. A variegated understanding of these local 
realities would help to identify policy interventions that support different groups (Bernstein 2010, Cous-
ins 2010). Cousins’ (2019a; 2019b) work has shown four different groups in South Africa’s rural agrarian 
structure. These are subsistence-oriented smallholder farmers growing food for themselves and selling 
occasionally; market-oriented smallholder farmers (in loose value chains) who mainly grow fresh vegeta-
bles under irrigation, with some rearing livestock; market-oriented smallholder farmers who supply tight 
value chains and most are under contract farming; and lastly small-scale black capitalist farmers who de-
rive income from off-farm activities in addition to farming. Such an approach can provide a more nuanced 
understanding that can help inform decision-makers on specific rural development policies, as we shall see 
in subsequent sections. 
On the other hand, the notions of depeasantisation, deagrarianisation, abandonment and deactivation can 
feed into the myths that such land is vacant, idle and unproductive. This is the narrative used by some 
foreign investors and the World Bank (2010) to justify the seizure of millions of hectares of customary land 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This narrative prevails in the context of the renewed global rush for land for large-
scale capitalist investments. It can also feed into the myth that all smallholder agricultural producers have 
lost the capacity and relevance to play a leading role in agricultural production. Consequently, this leads to 
disastrous policies that seek to decimate the resilient peasantry into proletariats in a context where capi-
talism is failing to provide decent wages to sustain livelihoods. In addition, such philosophies do not bode 
well for a land reform programme that targets small-scale farmers, as forcefully articulated by Jara (2019), 
Hall (2009) and Cousins (2019a; 2019b). Generalised patterns do not provide the nuances and modalities 
necessary to design local specific interventions. The next section provides the context in terms of who 
owns the land in Xolobeni and the struggles for and against mining.
Who owns the land and who makes decisions?
For those who live in Xolobeni, the registered nominal owner of the land is the Minister of Rural Develop-
ment and Land Reform. The rights of people who use the land are not formally registered. However, con-
trary to the Boserupian thesis of individualisation of land rights as the only form of secure tenure (see de 
Soto 2002), the majority of the homesteads (82, 5%) felt secure on their customary land in Xolobeni. The 
main reason for having a sense of security over their land is being in possession of the Permission-To-Oc-
cupy (PTO) certificate. Some of the homesteads draw their sense of security from the fact that land was 
allocated customarily, and that they were born in the area. They argued that no one could take their land 
away from them because of these two factors. Close to 9% of the respondents felt insecure, and the main 
source of insecurity was the proposed mine (6, 3%) (n=73). The new sense of insecurity can be traced to 
the long battle to stop the government from awarding a mining licence to the investors. Washinyira (2016) 
traced the sequence of events from 2001. The government granted an old-order prospecting licence to the 
mining company in 2002 and granted a full mining licence in 2008. This triggered local struggles culmi-
nating in the suspension of the licence four months later and the withdrawal of the licence in 2011. 
Following a series of struggles since then, the North Gauteng High Court ruled in 2018 that the Xolobeni 
community has a right to be consulted under the Mineral Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). 
Section 5(4) of the MPRDA stipulates that the investor must notify and consult the lawful occupiers. The 
MPRDA’s guidelines require a consultation report, but do not clearly allow a host community the right to 
say no. Therefore, the court went further to grant the community the right to give consent in line with the 
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA), Act 31 of 1996 and a widely established principle 
of international law that stipulates that indigenous peoples have the right to Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC). IPILRA was meant to ‘provide for the temporary protection of certain rights to and inter-
ests in land which are not otherwise adequately protected by law; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith’ (RSA 1996). IPILRA requires that the holder of informal land rights must give consent. Section 
2(1) states that, 
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... subject to the provisions of subsection (4), and the provisions of the Expropriation Act, 1975 (Act No. 
63 of 1975), or any other law which provides for the expropriation of land or rights in land, no person 
may be deprived of any informal right to land without his or her consent (RSA 1996).
The subsequent section 4 notes that the land right,
... can only be disposed by a majority of the holders of such rights present or represented at a meeting 
convened for the purpose of considering such disposal and of which they have been given sufficient no-
tice, and in which they have had a reasonable opportunity to participate (RSA 1996). 
In response to the ruling, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe had a two-pronged 
approach. First, he appealed the judgment. He explained, ‘[Why] we are appealing the ruling on Xolobeni is that, 
if you ask for full community approval, you transfer the authority of licensing from the state to the community. 
If you do that you create a chaotic situation’ (Mantashe in Magubane 2019). Mineral Resources director-general 
Thabo Mokoena has said that the ruling ‘marks the end of mining in South Africa’ (Radio 702). However, this is 
about recognising, upholding and protecting customary land rights and not about granting mining licenses. The 
government can still grant or not grant mining licences but only in line with the judgment. Secondly, Mantashe 
started the processes of consultation with the community in order to seek the community’s consent. The con-
sultation process has been marred by controversy and violence which undermines the principle of freeness. At 
one meeting, the police beat up some members of the community, fired teargas and rubber bullets that injured 
many. However, the Xolobeni community was not homogenous in its views. For example, a group of young peo-
ple claiming to have been ‘consulted’ by Mantashe said they want mining:
We, Xolobeni Youth for Sustainable Development are open to engagement with every potential investor and 
government. We are not surprised by the fact that ACC¹ rejects any potential development opportunity, because 
distracting development is an employment opportunity to ACC as they are getting funded to oppose.
The Youth for Sustainable Development allegedly have links to the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) part-
ners. In addition, some traditional leaders favoured mining. Lunga Baleni, the chief of the Amadiba Tribal Au-
thority, initially opposed the mining project. However, his views changed when he was made the director of the 
Xolobeni Empowerment Company with an envisaged 26% empowerment shareholding in the mining company. 
As observed in Limpopo, capital has shown the power to co-opt and marshal traditional leaders, local gangs and 
state officials in support of their investments (Zamchiya 2019). Another reality is that power and social relations 
regulate the communities. Therefore, groups like traditional leaders and local elites who are largely male are 
most likely to dominate the consultations. The next section now turns to the empirics to substantiate the central 
focus of this paper.
The evidence
This section provides a descriptive overview of the general incidence and extent of multiple key sources of 
cash income and production that Amadiba homesteads rely on to maintain their standard of living. Particular 
emphasis is given to employment and social grants, crop production, animal ownership and ocean resource 
harvesting. It then provides a brief overview of the incidence of other natural-resource activities that play a key 
role in enabling and supporting these activities, as well as making direct contributions in their own right. The 
section also debates the impact on asset accumulation and food self-sufficiency.
‘Deactivated’ jobs
Like many communities in South Africa, the Amadiba community suffers from a high rate of formal unemploy-
ment, which shows the importance of alternative self-sustaining land-based livelihoods. In the sample survey, 
only 12.7% (n=57) of adults (of 18 years or older) had access to any form of employment, and 48% (n=38) of 
homesteads did not have a single homestead member with a job. Of those with jobs, 70% (n=40) are men, and 
1Amadiba Crisis Committee.
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40% (n=26) of all jobs are held by men between the ages of 21 and 40 years. This shows that the formal labour 
market in South Africa is highly gendered. Those who are fortunate enough to find employment of any kind, 
however, tend to receive low wages, receiving a mean wage of R2, 700 per month. Moreover, those with jobs 
typically need to travel large distances, with only 17.5% (n=10) of those employed finding work in the nearest 
towns of Port Edward (n=8) and Bizana (n=2), and 8.8% (n=5) locally at the Amadiba guest lodge. While jobs 
provide an important source of income for those homesteads with a member able to find employment, social 
grants are the most reliable and largest source of cash income for many homesteads, providing an average in-
come of R2, 019 per month. A total of 99% (n=76) of homesteads have access to at least one social grant, but 
only 36% (n=29) claim the more significant old-age grant. Together, jobs and grants provide an average annual 
income of R3, 147 per month for an entire homestead. This means that in per capita terms, each individual 
homestead member receives on average only R357 per month from combined grant and employment income. 
For some this might be a call for mining investments that bring jobs. However, mining companies usually offer 
low-paying casual labour for the locals during the construction phase, resulting in precarious livelihoods. In 
addition, most members of each household had work to do. This included herding livestock, cultivating fields, 
fetching water, harvesting marine resources and marketing produce. All this had significant value, which some 
generally overlook. In as much as there was no formal employment, individuals still provided labour, extracting 
significant value. Experience elsewhere has shown that mining jobs for locals are usually temporary and the af-
termath of the mining project leaves economic and social devastation (Ferguson 1999). The next section details 
the land-based activities that sustained the communities outside formal employment. 
Activated cropping fields and incomes
Contrary to the literature about deactivated land and the shrinkage of agricultural activities resulting in relic 
agrarian populations, it is clear that households in Xolobeni universally practiced agriculture. All surveyed 
homesteads had at least some land under crop production, with 98% (n=78) cropping on fields and 79% 
(n=63) cropping on an adjacent garden. Nearly all homesteads grow key staple crops like maize (95%, n=71), 
sweet potatoes (86%, n=66), amadumbe (taro) (79%, n=62), potatoes (34%, n=27) and beans (65%, n=50). 
Koen (2016) found a similar trend. He found that mealie production per reporting household averaged at around 
743 kg per year, with a further 455 kg of sweet potatoes and 522 kg of amadumbe, with average field sizes at 
an estimated 2.7 hectares (Koen 2016). In addition, many homesteads (63%, n=50) also produced substantial 
amounts of fresh vegetables, particularly tomatoes (62%, n=45), but also onions (46%, n=33), spinach (44%, 
n=30), carrots (39%, n=29), and to a lesser extent green peppers (25%, n=18) and beetroot (9%, n=7). For 
those homesteads producing vegetables (including sweet potatoes), own-consumption meets an estimated 20% 
of their minimum vegetable requirements.²
Using local prices, the total value of crop production in the sample reaches R1.026 million, or approximately 
34% of all cash income from grants and jobs. This does not include bananas (grown by 26.3% of homesteads, 
n=21), sugarcane (22.5%, n=13), pumpkins (13.8%, n=11), chillies (7.5%, n=6), oranges (3.8%, n=3), peaches 
and brinjals (each 2.5%, n=2) mangoes, guavas, peanuts, pineapples, lemons, butternuts (each 1.3%, n=1). In 
addition to consuming their production, 83% (n=66) of homesteads also sell some of their crops locally and to 
‘bakkie’ traders, providing an important supplement to cash incomes from grants and jobs. On average home-
steads receive approximately R5, 924 each year from sales, particularly from sweet potatoes, of which 64% 
(n=48) of homesteads sold an average of 78% of their harvest, and amadumbe, of which 50% (n=39) of home-
steads sold 61% of their harvest. This did not indicate a decline in income from agricultural sales, as Bryceson 
(2004) would like us to believe.
Activated grazing lands 
In addition to cropping, animal production is a key component of homestead livelihoods, and most homesteads 
(87.5%, n=70) rely on the Amadiba’s communal grazing land to maintain their herds. Only 3.7% (n=3) of 
homesteads do not have any animals, with 71% (n=56) of homesteads owning an average of nine cattle (70%, 
n=55) owning an average of nine goats, 88% (n=69) of homesteads owning an average of 23 chickens, and 42% 
(n=33) of homesteads owning an average of three pigs. Together, animal ownership comes to an average value 
of R64, 921 per homestead. As with cropping, some animals are also sold every year by around 34% (n=26) of 
2Assumes a necessary 400g daily requirement.
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homesteads, particularly goats and chickens, attracting an extra average annual income of R3, 585. The total 
livestock value for the entire community is estimated at over R4 million (Koen 2016). The simple cash value of 
animals owned and sold, however, underplays their importance to homestead livelihoods. While animals pro-
vide an important source of meat protein, particularly chickens and pigs, they have a number of other uses and 
functions. Cattle in particular are integral to homestead cropping activities, with 83.6% (n=46) of cattle own-
ers using cattle for draught-power, and 20% (n=11) as a source of fertiliser. Moreover, animals are utilised by 
nearly all homesteads for ceremonial functions critical for broader social relationships. A total of 80% (n=44) of 
goat-owning homesteads used goats for such purposes, 58.2% (n=32) of cattle-owning homesteads used cows 
for such functions, and 35.7% (n=25) of chicken owning-homestead used chickens. Sources of livelihoods were 
multiple. 
Ocean harvesting 
In addition to landed production of crops and livestock, the Amadiba community’s close proximity to the coast 
enables homesteads to harvest significant resources from the ocean. A total of 93.6% (n=54) of homesteads 
surveyed harvest at least some ocean resources, particularly fish (68.4%, n=54), crayfish (62%, n=49), mus-
sels (50.6%, n=40), limpets (41.8%, n=33), octopus (36.7%, n=29), and sea water (22.8%, n=18) with some 
homesteads also harvesting crabs (7.5%, n=6), urchins (6.5%, n=5), red-bait (3.8%, n=3), sea-snails (5%, 
n=4), seaweed and oysters (2.5%, n=2), and eels, oysters and prawns (1.3%, n=1). However, some homesteads 
harvest from the ocean at much higher levels than others: 30% of fish, 16% of crayfish, 29% of mussels, 26% of 
limpets and 30% of octopus, are harvested by the largest harvesting homestead in each case. As with cropping 
and livestock, homesteads harvest from the ocean both for their own consumption and for sale. A total of 41% 
(n=33) of homesteads sell at least some resources harvested from the ocean, and the most commonly sold ocean 
resources are crayfish (39%, n=29) and fish (19%, n=14). On average, homesteads selling resources harvested 
from the ocean receive an extra R8, 447 per year, although one particular homestead receives 61% (n=R170, 
550) of this income. Nonetheless, other homesteads that sell still receive around R1, 200 per year from their 
sales. The area is also endowed with fresh sources of water. 
Natural resources harvesting
Homesteads at the Amadiba area collect water from the river and the spring and they also harvest rainfall. 
They walk to the river, and transport the collected water by carrying it on their heads or using their hands, or 
wheel-barrows. Water is often collected daily. An average of 4, 86 water containers (20/25 litres) is collected 
per day. The time they spend collecting water ranges from 2 minutes to 120 minutes (2hours). The collection 
is usually done by the whole family (41, 48%). All available homestead members collect water, but during the 
focus groups, both for the youth and the women, it was declared that water collection is primarily the duty of 
females. Table 1 shows that females are more involved in water collection than males. Children in homesteads 
also collect water, either alone (8,9%) or together with females (24%). 
Some homesteads at Amadiba use water for crop production; 66, 3% of the homesteads irrigate their crops in 
gardens (n=77). The homesteads irrigate vegetables in their gardens. Very few homesteads (3, 8%) irrigate the 
crops they planted in the fields, as shown in Table 2.
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If the mine gets the licence, such communal water uses will be disrupted. Mining processes transform the 
waterscape. As Sneddon (2007) has argued, pollution, contamination, toxics and the private enclosure of 
water sources are key outcomes of mining investments. In addition, other natural resources can be trans-
formed.
Harvesting natural resources from within the community also plays a key role in enabling and supporting 
various productive activities of the Amadiba community, as well as making direct contributions in their 
own right. All homesteads rely on firewood from the local area to meet their daily energy needs and nearly 
all homesteads further rely on other natural resources for the construction and quarterly maintenance 
of residential and other structures, particularly thatch (94.9%, n=75), poles (93.8%, n=75), sand/clay 
(87.3%, n=69), as well as grass and twigs (79.7%, n=63) and reeds (74.7%, n=59) collected for the man-
ufacture of items such as mats and brooms. Most (86.1%, n=68) homesteads also rely on local medicinal 
resources around twice a month, and 59% (n=46) use local sources of wood to carve furniture and other 
items each week. As with all other forms of local production and harvesting, some items are also sold to 
supplement homestead cash reserves. A significant number (40.4%, n=23) of homesteads that collect 
reeds also sell some, as do 22.2% (n=14) of those collecting grass and twigs, 18.1% (n=13) of those col-
lecting thatch, and 15.9% (n=10) of those collecting ‘muthi’. Moreover, significant numbers of homesteads 
further rely on the local area to supplement their food consumption, particularly by collecting wild herbs 
and fruit (81%, n=64), collecting honey (42.3%, n=33), hunting for wild animals (41.8%, n=33), and 
gathering insects (39.2%, n=31). Mining will lead to the enclosure and destruction of some of these natural 
resources in ways that will destroy local livelihoods. The next section briefly outlines the food dynamics.
Food self-sufficiency
From a combination of livelihood activities outlined above, most households are food self-sufficient. Many 
homesteads (53%, n=42) are able to meet their minimum carbohydrate requirements³ from the consump-
tion of staple crops, like maize, sweet potatoes, amadumbe (taro), potatoes, and beans, produced by home-
stead members. Many homesteads however, produce more than this minimum, and on average produce 
2.5 times the homestead’s necessary minimum. As Koen (2016:8) has argued, consumption data indicated 
a ‘sufficient, healthy and nutritionally varied diet facilitated by own-production and reciprocity along with 
the existence of internal markets and cash resources generated through external market sales. The diets 
reported in group discussions suggest that residents consume sufficient calories with adequate fat, protein 
and carbohydrate ratios’. Members of the community also regard themselves as food self-sufficient. This is 
well captured by one of the community members, in response to government’s assertion that Xolobeni was 
one of the poorest community in South Africa: 
When shall this stupidity stop? How can we be poor when we have land? We grow maize, sweet 
potatoes, taro, potatoes, onions, spinach, carrots, lemons and guavas, and we sell some of it to the 
market. We eat fish, eggs and chicken. This agriculture is what should be developed here. It is not 
falling apart like in many other places in Eastern Cape. We have cattle for weddings and traditional 
rituals. We have goats for ceremonies. We are not a part of the one out of four South Africans who 
go hungry to bed. We have a life. Poor infrastructure is not poverty (Washinyira 2016).
The mining project can therefore result in food insecurity as people lose their fields, grazing lands, access 
3Assumes a necessary 300g daily requirement.
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to water and natural resources. Economic activities are not just meant for poverty reduction but there are 
significant investments in the community, which shows the community’s potential to accumulate from 
below. 
Asset accumulation
The importance of natural resources and production of crops and animals to the livelihoods of Amadiba 
residents is also reflected in the levels of investment. In the first instance, key non-residential structures on 
homestead plots are largely geared towards the corralling of animals and storage of crops, and are largely 
constructed mainly or entirely from locally harvested materials. For example, 56% of all homesteads had 
a cattle kraal, which was constructed from mainly local materials by 95% of owners. Similarly, 38% of 
homesteads had a granary constructed mainly or entirely from local materials in 93% of cases. Perhaps 
more critically, Amadiba homesteads rely extensively on local materials for their residential structures. All 
homesteads claimed at least one rondavel, with 78% claiming two or more, 50% claiming three or more, 
and 20% claiming four or more. Upwards of 80% of homesteads relied mainly on local materials for their 
first, second, third, fourth and fifth rondavels. In addition, 68% of homesteads also claimed at least one 
‘flat’, constructed from mainly purchased materials in 66% of cases, and 23% claimed a second flat con-
structed from mainly purchased materials in 83% of cases.
The character of non-residential and livestock assets-ownership reflects the importance of landed pro-
duction and harvesting to Amadiba homesteads. The most commonly held homestead assets are hoes 
(94.9%, n=75) and solar panels (70.9%, n=56), followed by spades (78.5%, n=62), wheelbarrows (60.8%, 
n=48), and ploughs (51,9%, n=41); nearly all of which are agricultural items reliant on human and animal 
labour-power, with only 24% (n=19) owning a sprayer, and only one homestead owning two tractors. 
Non-agricultural assets that had a fairly common incidence were radios held by 44.3% (n=35) of home-
steads, gas and paraffin stoves held by 38% (n=30) and 35.4% (n=28) of homesteads respectively, and 
bicycles held by 20.3% (n=16) of homesteads. This shows a community that has the potential to engage in 
expanded agricultural production with some support.
This section has shown that beyond the legal right, the community resists the mining model of rural de-
velopment citing their activated agricultural fields, grazing lands, harvests from natural resources among 
other wider livelihoods benefits, which outweigh envisaged mining benefits. For some of the households, 
land- and ocean-based activities are central to having achieved a position of relative wealth, while for others 
they are critical to the maintenance of day-to-day life. However, in all cases land-based livelihoods are es-
sential in enabling households to create a higher standard of living. However, the government has appealed 
against the court ruling, continues to back the non-voluntary acquisition of land, marshals rural elites such 
as traditional leaders and hired local groups to coerce the community to submit to its vision of large-scale 
capitalist development. Up to this stage, this study has fallen into the trap of looking at the Xolobeni com-
munity as a homogeneous group. The next section therefore does further class analysis.
Class differentiation 
As observed so far, the livelihoods of Amadiba homesteads rely on combining a variety of forms of produc-
tion and income sources that make distinguishing those who are better or worse off difficult. Below, is an 
attempt to classify surveyed Amadiba homesteads by combining two sets of categories. The first divides 
homesteads into four groups according to their total estimated income from jobs, grants, sales, and the es-
timated value of carbohydrates consumed from crops. By this metric, ‘1’ represents the poorest group and 
‘4’ the richest. The second group distinguishes homesteads by the presence of employment and the relative 
importance of sales to overall income, including virtual income from the estimated value of carbohydrates 
consumed from staple crops. Those homesteads without any members in formal employment and who rely 
on sales for less than 30% of income are labelled as subsistence-oriented producers, representing 32.5% 
(n=26) of the sample and represented largely in the poorest income groups. Those homesteads without 
formal employment that receive over 30% of their income from sales are categorised as market-oriented 
producers, representing 16.3% (n=13) of the sample, and are almost entirely represented in the poorest 
income groups. Those homesteads that have at least one formally employed member and who rely on sales 
for over 30% of their income are defined as wage- and sale-reliant. These are the least common home-
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steads, representing only 5% (n=3) of the sample, but notably are all in the richest income group. Finally, 
47.5% (n=38) of the sample is categorised as wage-reliant, referring to those relying on sales for less than 
30% of their income, but holding at least one job, and are concentrated in the richest income groups. This 
is shown in Table 3 below.
Subsistence-orientated homesteads
Across all wealth groups, subsistence-oriented producers rely mainly on state social grants for the bulk 
of their income, and income from sales stem mainly from crops. Most (46%, n=12) subsistence-orient-
ed homesteads are in the poorest income group and the second-poorest group (30.7%, n=8), although 
there are significant differences between the two. The second-poorest group claims more than double the 
estimated average annual income of the poorest (R12,363 compared to R34,275), mainly because the sec-
ond-poorest group claims on average more than double the social grant income of the poorest (R23,040 
compared to R9,720). Both groups are marked by the relative absence of the old-age grant, which was held 
by only 25% of homesteads in both cases. 
In addition, the second-poorest group also produces three-times the value of crops (R13, 257 compared to 
R4, 309 [average]) and owns more than four times the amount of animal values (R80, 281 compared to 
R18, 720). Consequently, not only does the second-poorest group consume nearly three times its minimum 
carbohydrate requirements from staple crops as that of the poorest group (337% compared to 115%), but 
it also sells more than four times as much in value terms (R5,284 compared to R1,250). 
The 15% (n=4) of subsistence-oriented homesteads in the second-richest group are distinguished again 
mainly by their receipt of much greater grant income (R48, 600), but also significantly greater harvesting 
of ocean resources (R15, 143 compared to R9, 000), and more than double the number of animals (R228, 
813 compared to R80, 281).
The 7.7% (n=2) of subsistence-oriented homesteads in the richest income category, meanwhile, are distin-
guished mainly by their far greater production of crops (R28,692, compared to R12,338) and significantly 
greater sales of their harvest of ocean resources (R22,548 compared to R15,143). While not resulting in 
greater sales, these two homesteads consume 7.5 times more than their necessary minimum carbohydrate 
requirements. Also notable, however, is that these homesteads own far fewer livestock (R80, 000) com-
pared to the second-richest group. As livestock values were not incorporated into the income measure, the 
richest group may, consequently, not be substantively richer than the second-richest group.
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Market-oriented homesteads
While all homesteads are engaged in some way in the sale of some products of their own-production, 
market-oriented producers, representing 16.3% (n=13) of the sample, are distinguished by their reliance 
on sales for 30% or more of their income. Indeed, on average, market-oriented producers rely on sales for 
over 55% of their income.
Most market-oriented producers are in the poorest (38.5%, n=5) and second-poorest (46%, n=6) groups, 
and on average are both slightly poorer than subsistence-oriented producers in the same income categories, 
on average receiving R10,046 (compared to R12,363) and R28,258 (compared to R34,275) respectively. The 
most immediate reason is the far lower level of grant income received, with the poorest and second-poor-
est market-oriented producers receiving on average only R1, 728 and R7, 920 respectively (compared to 
the R9, 720 received by the poorest subsistence-producers). In place of grants, sales make up the majority 
of income, 80% of which are from crops. Although the value of own-production of both poorest and sec-
ond-poorest market-oriented producers is almost similar (at R83,1077 and R89,802), the second-poorest 
produce significantly more crops (R20,973 compared to R14,451) and harvest more resources from the 
ocean (R25,998 compared to R13,797) from which sales are derived. Moreover, the second-poorest group 
consumes a greater amount of carbohydrates, at 375% their estimated minimum requirements, compared 
to 256% for the poorest group. Nonetheless, it is notable that the poorest group on average claims more 
value from animals than the second-poorest group (R72, 100 compared to R42, 832).
Market-oriented producers also include one (7.7%) homestead in both the richest and second-richest in-
come groups. Compared to the second-poorest homesteads, the homestead in the second-richest income 
group receives both a higher grant income (R12,960 compared to R7,960) and also has more sales (R29,900 
compared to R15,815), but unlike the other market oriented producers, 83% of sales income comes from 
the sale of animals, and indeed this homestead owns far higher animal value at R165,780, with most of the 
balance coming from some sales of harvested ocean resources at R91,476. Indeed, cropping for this home-
stead is reserved almost exclusively for own consumption, at a value less than the second-poorest mar-
ket-oriented producers, but still providing 408% of the homestead’s minimum carbohydrate requirements. 
The richest market-oriented producer, meanwhile, enjoys an income more than double that of the sec-
ond-richest producer at R111,217, a consequence of not only doubling its received grant income, but a sub-
stantial growth in overall value of own-production. Unlike the second-richest market-oriented producer, 
sales income emanates mainly from cropping, which further allows the homestead to consume 1600% of 
its minimum carbohydrate requirements. This homestead also owns more animals than the second-richest 
homestead, but notably only slightly more than that of the second-richest subsistence-oriented producers.
Wage- and sale-reliant homesteads
Homesteads having at least one employed member while relying on sales for more than 30% of their 
income, accounted for only 3.8% (n=3) of homesteads, but were notably all in the richest income group, 
including the richest homestead in the sample. These three homesteads claimed relatively substantial 
average incomes from employment (R17, 000), social grants (R39, 000) and particularly from sales (R79, 
000), which are larger than that of the biggest market-oriented producer, and 92% of which was gar-
nered from the sale of ocean resources. Although the virtual income from cropping (R7, 898) is compar-
atively less substantial, these homesteads also meet 260% of their minimum carbohydrate requirements 
from crop consumption.
Wage-reliant homesteads
Homesteads that have at least one member with some form of employment, but for whom sales represent 
less than 30% of sales, represent the largest single class grouping, and are concentrated mainly in the rich-
est (37%, n=14) and second-richest (39%, n=15) income groups, and further represent the vast majority 
of homesteads within those income categories (at 75% and 70%, respectively). 
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The poorest (n=3) and second-poorest (n=6) homesteads notably receive similar average incomes from 
employment (R12, 800 compared to R11, 500) and are distinguished mainly by the receipt of grant income, 
of which the poorest receive none, and the second-poorest receive (R12, 960). The second-richest group 
further sees grant income of more than double (R27, 792) and from sales (R5, 129) a near doubling of sal-
ary income (R21, 450), while the richest group sees a near trebling of salary income from this level (R61, 
406) and a significant growth in sales (R9, 100). On average, wage-dependent homesteads rely on sales for 
9% of their cash income, across income groups.
Although access to social grants and total salary income is central to differences in income between 
wage-reliant homesteads, own-production still plays a vital role in bolstering cash income by provid-
ing a subsistence base, with surpluses providing further cash supplements. A common characteristic of 
wage-dependent homesteads across income categories is the consistency in the average value of staple 
carbohydrates produced for own consumption (at around R3, 200) and similar levels of minimum carbo-
hydrate consumption met by own-production (at around 190%). The total value of crop and ocean har-
vesting rises gradually across income groups, due largely to growing crop production, as the total value of 
ocean harvesting remains relatively stable (around R8,500) for all but the second-poorest income group. 
Cropping similarly accounts for the bulk of sales income except for the poorest income group, for which 
it contributes around one-third of sales (33%) alongside sales of ocean harvesting (37%) and livestock 
(29%). The average value of total livestock ownership peaks with the second-poorest income group at R70, 
973, with the poorest and second-richest groups claiming similar levels of livestock at around R51, 000 and 
the richest group notably owning the lowest at R37, 608. 
This section used a class analytic approach to identify four social groups in Xolobeni that is subsistence-ori-
ented; market-oriented; wage- and sale-reliant; and wage-reliant households. It further showed the dif-
ferences between and within the groups. The various sources of value and income, if combined, would see 
many households from the sample living above the poverty datum line. What is evident, is a viable agrarian 
base in contrast to the theses of deagrarianisation and deactivation of fields in South Africa. This is import-
ant when debating the future of rural development policies. 
What is the future? Pursuing alternative models of development
This section presents three recommendations. The first is for the state to pursue the principles of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and the fair valuation of the community’s multiple livelihoods. The 
second recommendation is for greater government investment in eco-tourism in the Xolobeni area. The 
final recommendation is for public investment in smallholder agriculture in this area.  
Implementation of FPIC and fair valuation principles 
The Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and the investing company should hold consultations in 
good faith with the Xolobeni community. The consultations must include those who will be directly and 
indirectly affected by the project. Consent must be a collective decision of all those affected, including 
women, not some discreet and powerful groups. There must be no intimidation, coercion or manipula-
tion during the process. This is because undue influence will render the whole process null and void. In 
addition, it is the duty of government and the investor to provide the Xolobeni community with sufficient 
information about the project so that they are able to make informed decisions. If the Xolobeni community 
reaffirms its resentment, the company must then immediately abandon the project because no develop-
ment must happen without free, prior and informed consent. Should the community change its decision 
and collectively agree, then FPIC processes should continue at all stages of the project, mindful of the fact 
that the community has the right to revoke consent at any stage. In the context of consent, the government 
must conduct an evaluation of current livelihoods for a period of at least 22 years, which is the lifespan 
of the mine, in addition to giving communities alternative viable land. If the status quo remains, then the 
following two recommendations signify the future.
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Eco-tourism
A strong voice from the community is for the government to invest in tourism in the area. This is a viable 
alternative to a finagled mining venture. Grant Thornton (2005) conducted a useful assessment of the so-
cio-economic benefits of the proposed tourism investment in the Xolobeni area in ways that can help deci-
sion-makers to assess the merits of the proposed mining venture.⁴  The study concluded that ‘the proposed 
tourism investments will have significant financial, economic and socio-economic benefits for the study 
area that will remain long after the 22-year lifespan of the mining operation’ (Grant Thornton 2005:10).
The benefits outlined above are significant and have not been disputed by any other study. In addition, 
investments in tourism are likely to generate less social conflict, preserve a viable agrarian base, conserve 
ecological natural resources and ensure that the state has longer-term access to revenue than the envisaged 
22 years of operation which will not only benefit Xolobeni but the wider South African community. The 
proposed eco-tourism can then be augmented by support of agriculture in the Xolobeni area.
Public investment in smallholder agriculture 
Contrary to the dominant narratives of the abandonment of cropping fields, Xolobeni provides a viable 
agrarian base with the potential for expanded production, resulting in wider processes of accumulation 
from below. The farmers already produce not only for consumption but also for the market. There is sig-
nificant on-farm investments. The area has natural water sources that boost the potential for irrigation 
agriculture. This requires massive public investment in agricultural production. A one-size-fits-all will not 
work given the differentiated nature of the Xolobeni community. However, there are programmes that can 
benefit the entire community, such as the provision of farming inputs, water schemes, roads, state market-
ing agencies and extension services. In addition to those, there is the need for policy-makers to recognise 
that Xolobeni is socially differentiated with subsistence-oriented households, market-oriented households, 
wage- and sale-reliant households and wage-reliant households. This would require tailor-made interven-
tions that will both support poverty reduction and promote the expanded production for wider nation-
al economic development in ways that do not exclude women. Market-oriented households, wage- and 
sale-reliant households and wage-reliant households could even benefit from South Africa’s ongoing redis-
tributive land reform programme. They would probably fit into Cousins’ (2019a; 2019b) conceptualisation 
4Grant Thornton is a private company.
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of market-oriented households who already produce fresh vegetables and livestock for local informal mar-
kets. Tailor-made policies are broadly summarised in the next table.
Class category Main state focus Major outcomes
Subsistence-oriented
Ecological management of grazing lands 
Subsidised crop inputs support Food self-sufficiency 
Food production support on
garden plots and fields
Food security
Water harvesting for all-year irrigated gardens Poverty reduction
Market-oriented
Marketing support for vegetables and crops 
Marketing support for livestock Increased agricultural productivity
State marketing boards (reintroduction for the 
black smallholder farmers) Expanded production
Veterinary support Accumulation from below
Crop inputs support Contribution to wider growth of local economy
Small-scale irrigation schemes
Additional cropping land (possibly from South 
Africa’s redistributive land reform programme)
Additional grazing land (possibly from South 
Africa’s redistributive land reform programme)
Appropriate farm technology
Wage- and sale-reliant and 
wage-reliant
Small-scale irrigation schemes
Cooperative markets Increased productivity
Support for livestock expansion Expanded production
Cooperatives for sourcing inputs Contribution to wider growth of local economy
Additional cropping land
Additional grazing land
Extension support services
Farm technology
Source: Compiled by author.
Table 5: Class-based policy interventions
The above recommendations are based on the class analysis provided in this paper, as a foundation to so-
licit detailed views on the kind of agricultural support the different social groups require and to contribute 
to national debate about the future of South Africa’s rural development policy interventions.
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Conclusion
This paper has shown that not all the inhabitants of rural South Africa are vestiges of agrarian populations 
spurred by long historic processes of deagrarianisation and its sub-genre of depeasantisation. The effects 
were uneven between and within differentiated communities. Consequently, other communities like Xolo-
beni do not reflect the dominant narrative of abandoned and deactivated cropping fields, as land-based 
livelihoods are still very central. Failure to understand the geographically and socially differentiated nature 
of South African communities can lead to the state’s prescription for rural development policies that are 
not in harmony with community needs. For Xolobeni, land and agriculture remain an integral component 
of livelihoods and there were strong voices raised against mining in this area. Following a series of strug-
gles, the court ruled that the community has a right to say no to a development project, in line with the 
international principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). In addition to this legal right, the study 
has shown that the community actively use land for gardening, crop and livestock production for both con-
sumption and for sale. People fetch water from the river and the spring freely, and harvest rainfall. They 
use forests for firewood, poles for housing and fencing, wild fruits, medicinal plants and thatch grass. The 
sea is important for the harvesting of marine resources such as fish and other edible resources. However, 
the benefits differed to a degree across a continuum of subsistence-oriented households, market-oriented 
households, wage- and sale-reliant households and wage-reliant households. This calls for a class-informed 
policy intervention in the event of the community upholding its rejection of the mining venture. The in-
terventions could include eco-tourism and state agrarian support for both poverty reduction and expand-
ed production to help contribute to wider national economic development. In the unlikely event that the 
community agrees to the mining in that area, then the state must unequivocally recognise the community’s 
customary rights and allow for a fair evaluation of their multiple livelihoods for a period of at least 22 years, 
in addition to the provision of alternative land in high potential agro-ecological areas as compensation
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